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Abstract
Behavioral ecologists assume that animals use a motivational mechanism for decisions such as action selection and time
allocation, allowing the maximization of their fitness. They consider both the proximate and ultimate causes of behavior in
order to understand this type of decision-making in animals. Experimental psychologists and neuroeconomists also study
how agents make decisions but they consider the proximate causes of the behavior. In the case of patch-leaving,
motivation-based decision-making remains simple speculation. In contrast to other animals, human beings can assess and
evaluate their own motivation by an introspection process. It is then possible to study the declared motivation of humans
during decision-making and discuss the mechanism used as well as its evolutionary significance. In this study, we combine
both the proximate and ultimate causes of behavior for a better understanding of the human decision-making process. We
show for the first time ever that human subjects use a motivational mechanism similar to small insects such as parasitoids
[1] and bumblebees [2] to decide when to leave a patch. This result is relevant for behavioral ecologists as it supports the
biological realism of this mechanism. Humans seem to use a motivational mechanism of decision making known to be
adaptive to a heterogeneously distributed resource. As hypothesized by Hutchinson et al. [3] and Wilke and Todd [4], our
results are consistent with the evolutionary shaping of decision making because hominoids were hunters and gatherers on
food patches for more than two million years. We discuss the plausibility of a neural basis for the motivation mechanism
highlighted here, bridging the gap between behavioral ecology and neuroeconomy. Thus, both the motivational
mechanism observed here and the neuroeconomy findings are most likely adaptations that were selected for during
ancestral times.
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Introduction
From basic behaviors to complicated decisions, all animals,
including humans, have to make choices throughout their life in
order to maximize their utility function [5–8]. The choice of the
best option can be defined either in proximate terms (satisfaction,
welfare, reinforcement) or in ultimate functions (fitness); however,
proximate decision cues are supposed to have a predictive value
for fitness. Neuroeconomists study the proximate mechanisms of
such decisions in humans and look at the role of the different brain
areas in the decision process [9]. On the other hand, behavioral
ecologists interpret the proximate mechanisms of decision-making
in animals within the framework of a natural selection process
[10]. We note that similar problems are studied in both fields, but
from a different point of view. For example, human and animal
decisions in terms of foraging activities are studied in situations
where the resource distribution is clumped in patches (e.g.
information on the internet for humans [11] and prey for animals
[12]). Thus, it is important to decide when the current action
should be continued (foraging on the current patch) and when to
switch to another action (leave the patch) in order to maximize the
yield. This problem originated from Charnov’s well-known
Marginal Value Theorem [12]. He identified the optimal decision
to leave the current patch as a function of the rate of energy gain
in the environment. Iwasa et al. [13] later showed that the optimal
decision should rely on a Bayesian estimation of the number of
prey remaining in a patch.
Behavioral ecologists have suggested that insects such as
parasitoids and bumblebees use a motivational mechanism
[1,14] (Figure 1) to perform these tasks. Here, the term motivation
is defined according to the implicit motivational system described
by McClelland et al. [15]: motivation is a biological variable that
drives a behavior in the sense that it energizes, directs and selects
behavior [16,17]. Dorman and Gaudiano [18] following Hull [19]
and Skinner [20], provide a very similar definition: ‘‘the internal
force that produces actions on the basis of the momentary balance
between our needs and the demands of our environment’’. These
definitions apply to both humans and animals, and this concept is
assigned to the category of hidden or latent variables, which
cannot be measured directly but only by its correlation with an
observable behavior. According to the motivational hypothesis of
making the decision to leave the patch, an animal enters a patch
with an initial motivation that decreases monotonically as long as
no rewarding item is found. Each time an item is discovered, the
motivation suddenly increases (positive reward, incremental
model) or decreases (negative reward, decremental model). The
animal leaves the patch when the motivation falls below a certain
threshold. This process was first described in Waage’s model [1],
in which the value of the increment depends on the time since the
last capture.
We examine here whether human subjects follow a similar
process in a foraging task. In order to simplify the motivational
model, we assume here that the value of the increment constant
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further examine whether or not this simplification holds. Under
this assumption, the level of motivation m(t) at time t in the current
patch is simplified as:
mt ðÞ ~aP{btznt ðÞ I ð1Þ
where aP is the initial tendency to stay in the patch, b the slope of
the linear decrease, n(t) the number of hosts met by time t and I the
value of the motivation increment (greater than 0) or decrement
(less than 0). Otherwise, if we accept Waage’s original model, the
course of motivation should be written as:
mt ðÞ ~aP{btz
X n
j~1
Ij ð2Þ
The rule emerging from these processes is quite simple: the
animal leaves the patch when m(t) falls under a given value m0
which can be fixed at 0 without the loss of generality. The sign of I
is important for the adaptive value of the behavior. It is now
accepted that the adaptive value of the sign of I depends on the
distribution of the prey or hosts among the patches. This concept
arose from the work of Iwasa et al. [13]. They devised a process
that is quite different from Waage’s model but which share some of
the same features. They addressed the question of how a Bayesian
forager can estimate the number of items remaining in a patch
when it has caught n of them after having spent a time t in it. They
first showed that for an over-dispersed distribution, the pair (n, t)i s
a sufficient statistic for that. Secondly, they showed that each
discovery and consumption of a new item resulted in a sudden
increase of this estimation, such as the negative binomial, whereas
they resulted in a sudden decrease for an underdispersed
distribution such as the binomial. As the Marginal Value Theorem
is based on a rate of discovery and depends on the number of
remaining items in the patch, many authors have concluded that
the incremental case for Waage-like models was adaptive in very
clumped distributions and that the decremental one was adaptive
for even distributions (see [21] for a review).
Behavioral ecologists have hypothesized that natural selection
tailored decision-making based on a motivational process, which is
adapted to the resource distribution that animals experience [13].
As mentioned above, it is not possible to record the motivation
itself, only proxies. Human beings are the only animals that can be
asked to assess and communicate their own motivation. Verbal self
evaluation by the subjects may be a better proxy than the
behavioral ones available in animals. Psychologists admit that
humans are able to accurately report some cognitive processes by
introspection [22,23]. For example, Corallo et al. [24] demon-
strated the remarkable accuracy of introspective estimates of task
duration. Their results show that subjects excel at estimating the
duration of their internal process. With respect to motivation,
different self-reported measures are routinely used to assess the
motivational state of humans and the psychometric properties of
these measures have been widely supported [25]. There are also
many psychological and neuronal evidences of a human
introspective system providing a subjective image of an emotional
state [26]. In this sense, humans appear to be an appropriate
model to study this motivation-based mechanism. The method,
however, is far from being unbiased and its results must be
discussed thoroughly.
Many authors have studied how such a decision could be
mediated in the human brain in relation to the predictability of
finding a resource [27–30]. Quite recently, Hutchinson et al. [3]
and Wilke et al. [31], using two different electronic games, found
the fundamental result that human decision-making is insensitive
to the resource distribution. In this article, we primarily address
the question of the likelihood of a motivational process sharing the
features proposed by Waage and other authors, in the case of
human subjects faced with a foraging task. In particular, we ask if
it is possible to find evidence of the increase and decrease of
motivation linked to the amount of time spent without finding any
items (weariness), the discovery of items (reinforcement) or the
finding of an empty chest (disappointment). We will also examine
if this process is sensitive to the distribution of items among patches
during a time-limited foraging task.
For this purpose, we devised a foraging computer game and
asked the subjects to evaluate their own motivation during the
task. We recorded the foraging behavior and declared motiva-
tional states of the subjects in various environments differing in
terms of the resource distributions among patches. The resource
was either evenly distributed or aggregated (low vs. high levels of
variance, respectively).
Materials and Methods
We developed a software system in the style of a FPS game
(‘‘first person shooter’’, a video game centering the player inside a
realistic 3D-environment) that records the instant-by-instant
actions of individuals foraging for patchily distributed resources
during a period of 30 min. The potential locations where resource
might be found are represented by chests. Each chest either
contains the resource (depicted by a little green sphere, see
Figure 2) or it is empty. 49 Chests are distributed over 40 patches
(in the shape of a dome) that are randomly distributed in a
meadow. To disorientate the players inside the domes, each dome
has 8 doors at its periphery and the chests are randomly
Figure 1. The motivational mechanisms of decision-making in
parasitoids and the bumblebee. The insect enters a patch with an
initial motivation to stay, which decreases linearly when no reward is
found (in the case of parasitoids, hosts for laying eggs). Note that the
motivation suddenly increases (incremental mechanism —) or decreas-
es (decremental mechanism – –) when a reward is found (D). The
decision to leave the patch occurs when the motivation falls below a
given threshold (*). From Waage (1979).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014251.g001
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distance units in width and 3600 in height. The player speed is
approximately 16 units6min
21. A fog reduces the visibility to
prevent the subjects from visually spotting the distribution of the
domes or to glean any information about the quality of the dome.
Therefore, the players can only gather information by active
foraging. Once inside a dome, the game is interrupted each time a
chest is opened. In order to continue foraging in the patch, player
must evaluate his motivational level typing in a number between 0
and 9 on the keypad, where 0 means ‘‘I want to leave the current
dome and forage elsewhere’’ and 9 means ‘‘I want to continue to
forage in the current dome’’. After being opened, each chest
appears as it did before but no longer contains a sphere inside.
With this procedure, the total number of chests inside a dome is
constant and the player cannot distinguish an already opened
chest from one that has never been opened. Each dome can be
exploited only once. After leaving a dome, its colour changes to
red, indicating that it has already been exploited, and all of the
doors are closed. During the experiment, the program records all
of the player’s actions and the declared motivation level in real
time. To test if humans adapt their behavior to the resource
distribution, five map types are defined. In each map, the spatial
distribution of the domes throughout the meadow is the same;
however, the domes differ in terms of their content. The ratio of
filled/empty chests is based on three probability distributions: the
number of items per patch is either Poisson distributed (random
distribution, 1 map, l=30), binomially distributed (even distribu-
tion, 2 maps, respectively. p=0.25 and p=0.4) or negative
binomially distributed (very clumped distribution, 2 maps,
respectively. k=0.5; m=10 and k=0.1; m=15). Based on the
work of Iwasa et al. [13], we assume that the optimal theoretical
strategy differs according to the resource distribution.
Ninety-two subjects living within the vicinity of the University of
Rennes 1 were recruited (53 men, 39 women; aged between 18–55
and 18–57, SE 8.01 and 10.50) for the software beta-test (12
subjects) and for the experiment (80 subjects). Each subject played
the game only once. All of the subjects were volunteers and did not
receive any payment. The best five scores of the five maps were
published at the university. Because the recruitment was passive,
we considered the subjects to be motivated to win the game. One
of the five resource distributions is randomly assigned to the
subject without any indication. Following Hutchinson et al. [3], the
goal and method are explained with a slideshow on a computer
during a period of 5 min. The 30 min experiment is preceded by a
4 min practice session with the same resource distribution. This
familiarizes the player with the game, keyboard manipulation and
measurement of his motivation. According to learning theories,
the subjects need some experience within an environment in order
to stabilize their foraging strategy. For this reason, we only
considered the last half of the visited domes in each player’s
record. We first fitted the motivational model to the player’s own
assessment of his motivation course using by five linear and non-
linear methods.
Direct linear fitting (lm function of R)
Equation (2) can be fitted by a multiple linear regression with t,
the time spent in the patch and n the number of items found at
time t as an independent variable. This is model 1. An alternative
is to consider whether the opening of an empty chest has a
decremental effect. This is model 2, and the equation becomes:
mt ðÞ ~aP{btznI{mD ð3Þ
where m is the number of empty chests opened at time t and D is
their decremental effect. This first approach has some inconve-
niences. The estimate is unconstrained and may be negative or
greater than 9. Testing its significance relies on the classical
hypothesis on the normality, homoscedasticity and independence
of the residuals which are dubious when the observed variable is
both discrete and bounded.
Non-linear fitting (nls function of R)
If the bounding of the observed motivation is taken into
account, it can be introduced as a ‘‘chop’’ function leading to the
following model:
Figure 2. Screenshots of the virtual foraging game. Top: An
overview of the virtual meadow with the spatial distribution of the
patches. Middle: The chests when the player enters a patch. Bottom:
The player opened a filled chest and found the resource. The French
text on the bottom screenshot asks the subject to note his motivation
to stay in the dome (from 0 to 9). At any given time, the player knows
both the number of items found (left top corner of the screen) and the
instantaneous yield (left bottom corner).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014251.g002
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^ m mt ðÞ ~aP{btznI
if ^ m mt ðÞ w9 then ^ m mt ðÞ ~9
if ^ m mt ðÞ v0 then ^ m mt ðÞ ~0
end
ð4Þ
This is model 3. Its inconvenience is to increase the kurtosis of
the residuals distribution by forcibly setting some of the residuals to
zero.
Generalized linear models (glm function of R)
The last approach considers the declared motivation as a
binomial variable taking discrete values from 0 to 9, linearly linked
to the external variables t, n through a logit link. The advantage is
to avoid the hazardous hypothesis of the normality and
independence of the residuals. The inconvenience is that the
constancy of the residuals is no longer valid on the measurement
scale, but only on the logit scale. On the scale of the
measurements, the increments are large when the declared
motivation is close to 4.5 and small when it is close to either 0
or 9. However, this might be realistic. The model 4 is then:
ln
^ m m
9{^ m m
~aP{btznI ð5Þ
where ^ m m is the estimate of the declared motivation. Model 5 is the same
as model 4 but it incorporated the effect of opening empty chests.
These five sorts of models correspond to three different
psychological hypotheses:
Linear approach (models 1 and 2)
- The declared motivation is a faithful reflection of the
motivational state of the individual, this motivational state
is bounded and the subject has no difficulty to map it on
the obliged interval.
Non-linear approach (model 3)
- The real motivation is not bounded, the subject has to
chop it and a declared motivation of 9 means ‘‘9 or
more’’ just as 0 means ‘‘0 or even less’’. However, the real
motivation is a linear function of t and n, and the interval
[0,9] is a window to it.
Generalized linear model approach (models 4 and 5)
- The real motivation is not bounded, the subject has to
map it on the interval [0,9] and the mapping is of logit
type. This means that it requires more increments to pass
from 8 to 9 than from 4 to 5.
It was therefore interesting to see globally which of these models
fit best overall. To assess the significance of the fit, we used the
Bonferroni procedure at the level of risk 0.05/80. A significance
level such as this must be regarded carefully because of the
unavoidable correlation between residuals in time series. In our
case, this level only indicates if the fit of the model is better than
the null model. We then focused on (i) rho2, which is a statistical
indication about how well the model fits the observed motivation
and (ii) the AIC (Akaike’s information criterion), which measures
the goodness of fit of the model. We point out the fact that one of
the variables included in models 2 and 5, the number of empty
chests opened, is directly linked to the time spent on the patch
because it takes time to open chest and the number of empty chests
opened is proportional to the time needed to open them. However,
the AIC is known to detect strongly correlated variables and the
addition of a strongly correlated variable could increase the AIC,
thus indicating that the variable adds nothing to the model.
Moreover, the linear model can solve the partial confusion
between the variables (such as time and the number of empty
chests opened). These five models were fitted individually to each
participant. In the end, we kept model 5, as explained in the
‘‘Results’’ section. After examining the variety of the subjects’
reactions, we discovered that it would be very complicated to
analyze the data if the subjects were considered as a random factor
in an overall analysis, especially since it is important to visually
examine the fit of each individual run with the model.
We then used Cox’s proportional hazard model to determine
the effect of the different stimuli on the tendency to leave the
patch. This model allows us to estimate the hazard rate at time t,
which can be interpreted as a tendency to leave the patch. We
estimated the effect of the different intra-patch cues (opening a
filled chest, opening an empty chest), extra-patch cues (total
number of empty/filled chests before entering the patch, travel
time between two successive patches) and fixed covariates (sex,
age, laterality, knowledge of the optimal foraging theory) on the
tendency to leave the current patch. We integrated a random
effect modelized by the Gamma frailty model describing the excess
risk above any measured covariates due to multi-censored data for
each individual [32]. The idea is that individuals have different
frailties and those individuals who are more frail will leave the
patch earlier than the others. The hazard rate hj(t) of the j
th
individual at time t in the patch is given by:
hj t,z1,:::zi,:::,zn ðÞ ~vkh0 t ðÞexp
X n
i~1
bizi
()
ð6Þ
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function to leave the patch
depending only on the time spent on it (all of the covariates are set to
zero) and ziare the covariates which influence the tendency to leave the
patch with bi contributions. vk is the frailty parameter for each subject.
The patch-leaving tendency is reduced if a hazard ratio (exp{gbizi}) is
lower than 1, whereas a hazard ratio greater than 1 increases this
tendency. Finally we investigated the plausible relationship between the
results from model 5 and Cox’s model: we took into account the
simplified Waage’s model which explained more than 50% of the
variance (R
2$0.5). According to Pierre [33], Waage’s parameters
cannot be identified separately on the basis of the mere observation of
the patch residence time. Only aP/b and I/b can be identified
separately. We used another Cox proportional hazard model that
integrates only the effect of opening a filled chest on the leaving
tendency for each individual. We then correlated the value of the
covariate b corresponding to the effect of encountering an item on the
patch-leaving tendency and the measure of an associative factor from
Waage’s model fitting.
All of the computations were done with the R 2.10.0. software
(R development core team, 2009).
Results
During the 30 min experimental session, a player visited an
average of 9.6 domes (SE 0.36), opened 252 chests (SE 7.63) and
Human’s Motivation to Foraging
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was 758s (SE 2.33). The mean gain rate at the end of the game was
3.46 spheres.min
21 (SE 0.10, range 0–18.2 spheres.min
21).
Of the 80 motivational trajectories (one per subject), 78 showed
a significant fit to model 5, the Generalized Linear Model with
covariates t, n and nloose (see ‘‘Materials and Methods’’ section for
a description of all of the models) at the Bonferroni level
a’=0.000625 (0.05/80, x
2). However, this significant level only
indicates that our model fits the data better than the null model.
According to the AIC criterion, this model gives the best results in
34 out of 80 cases (Table 1). The simple unconstrained linear
models are the best ones in only a few cases. The non-linear
chopped model and the generalized linear model 4 appear to be
equivalent. In more than 42% of the cases, the inclusion the
number of empty chests opened decreases the AIC of the model.
This demonstrates the decremental effect of opening empty chests
even if the AIC gain is low in all of the cases.
Bellow, we will refer to model 5 as the best fitting model.
Referring to the hypothesis that we formulated in the ‘‘Material
and Methods’’ section, this indicates that subjects are well able to
map the evaluation of their motivation into the 9-point scale that
we specified. Taking in consideration the effect of opening an
empty chest appears also to be important. However, the overall fit
of model 5 does not represent the quality of fit, which is very
different from one individual to another. After an examination of
the visual fit of each model line to each motivation course and
other criteria such as the presence of visible bias on the residuals vs.
fitted values diagrams, we then decided to classify the results into
three categories: (i) G - good. The line of the fitted values plotted
against time correctly follows the line of the motivation declared
by the subjects. No systematic bias is observable on the graph of
the residuals against fitted values. (ii) M - medium or acceptable.
The line of the fitted values correctly follows at least some parts of
the graph, generally in some patches. (iii) B - bad or poor. The line
of the fitted values is not very coherent with the course of the
motivation, strong biases are observed in the graph of the
residuals. We then compared this visual appreciation to the
determination coefficient of the model as a measure of the
goodness of fit. Figure 3 shows the relationship between this visual
and partly subjective classification and R
2. Clearly, there is a
strong relationship between the classification and goodness of fit.
We found this procedure better than a cut on the basis of the R
2
because as shown in this figure, a high R
2 value can mask strong
biases. On this basis, 49 fits were considered as good (61.25%), 19
as medium (23.75%), and 12 as bad (15%). If the good and
medium cases are added up, there are 68 acceptable fits and 12
bad (unacceptable) fits. We concluded that 85% of the subjects
show a course of their declared motivation which is coherent with
a process in which the discovery of an item in a chest has an
increasing effect and the opening of an empty chest a decreasing
effect.
We also verified Waage’s hypothesis linking the size of the
increments in reported motivation to the delay since the last
discovery of an item. We actually found a weak effect from this
delay (Figure 4). The shape is coherent with Waage’s idea of an
increase from zero to a maximum value, and for this reason it
Table 1. Number and percent of cases where each model
and model class appears to be the best using the AIC
criterion.
Model
number Best model % Model class Best class %
1 3 3.75 Linear 7 8.75
24 5
3 19 23.75 Non linear 19 23.75
4 20 25 Generalized linear 54 67.5
5 34 42.5
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014251.t001
Figure 3. Relationship between the visual classification of the
overall fit and goodness of fit of individual motivation, given
by R
2 in the adjusted model 5. b: bad visual adjustment (strong
discrepancy between the course of motivation and the fitted values); m:
medium visual adjustment (partial consistency); g: good visual
adjustment (total consistency, no systematic bias).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014251.g003
Figure 4. Relationship between the size of the increments and
the delay since the last discovery of an item. Each petal of the
sunflower plot represents one overlapped point. The relationship (red
dotted line, increment=13.67627(1-exp(-0.06025delay))) is in accordance
with Waage’s model but the effect is weak and blurred by a large noise.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014251.g004
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It ðÞ ~IM 1{exp {aD ðÞ ðÞ ð7Þ
by non-linear least squares (nls function of R base), where D is the
delay since the last discovery, a a parameter and IM the maximum
possible value of the increment. Although significant, the model
only explains 6% of the variance (R
2=0.06) and Figure 4 shows
how the variables are the observed values and the poor
contribution of the model. We conclude that there is something
true in Waage’s intuition in the case of man, but that this effect is
blurred by a large noise.
Figure 5 shows the fit of each of the three classes of the model 5
in one individual (good, medium and poor fit, respectively). A
feature that is worth noting is that the fit classified as ‘‘bad’’ is
completely different from the others. It is clear that these subjects
do not exhibit, at all, a course of their evaluated motivation that is
compatible with Waage’s model. We were not able to determine if
it resulted from an inability to assess their own motivation or if it is
due to a completely different strategy. We discarded these
individuals from further comparisons between Waage’s process
and the analysis of incremental/decremental effect by Cox, given
that they did not follow Waage’s process.
For all of the players, the estimated values of the motivational
model 5 (initial motivation, decrease of motivation, motivational
increment and decrement due to the opening of an empty chest)
did not differ significantly in different environments (respectively.
F=0.13, df=4; 71, NS, F=1.01, df=4; 71, NS, F=0.66, df=4;
71, NS and F=1.93, df=4,71, NS). The players entered a patch
with a high motivational level (initial motivation =7.49, after
inverse logistic transform, SE 1.73) that decreased over time
(b=0.062s
21, SE 0.00505 on the logit scale) and left the patch
when the motivational level approached 0. Opening a filled chest
increased the motivational level by 0.47 (SE 0.53) units on average
(on the logit scale), in every resource distribution scenario. The
model was therefore incremental, respective to the discovery of a
filled chest in every environment. We should note that on the
motivational scale, neither the increments I, nor the slope of
decrease b are constant. They are curved functions depending on t
and n.
The analysis of the residence time by Cox’s proportional hazard
model [34–36] (see the ‘‘Materials and Methods’’ section)
supported our previous results: opening a filled chest decreased
this tendency regardless of the resource distribution (Table 2; the
effect of the resource distribution – not shown – was not
significant). Opening an empty chest increased the player’s
tendency to leave the patch but this effect is lower than the
incremental effect of finding a resource. In order to compare this
with an alternative model to explain the patch leaving decision, we
added another covariable independent of the number of
discoveries but dependent of time since the last discovery
(giving-up time). As shown by Hutchinson et al. [3], the more
time that has passed since the last discovery, the lower the
tendency to leave the patch. The effect of the number of
discoveries influenced the leaving-tendency 16 times more than
the giving-up time. The extra-patch experience also changed the
tendency to leave: if more filled chests were opened in the previous
patches, the tendency to leave the visited patch was higher.
Conversely, if the more empty chests were opened in the previous
patches, the tendency to leave the visited patch was lower. In
addition, when the travel time between two successive patches was
longer, the tendency to leave the visited patch decreased. To find
possible effects of the different categories of individuals, different
factors and covariates were included in Cox’s proportional hazard
model such as age, sex, laterality, type of environment, knowledge
of Optimal Foraging Theory, and familiarity with video games.
Only two fixed covariates influenced the tendency to leave: age
and laterality (Table 2). Being older or left-handed decreased the
tendency to leave a patch when compared respectively to being
young or right-handed.
Figure 6 shows the correlation between the values of the
covariate b, corresponding to the effect of encountering an item on
the patch-leaving tendency, and the values of the term I/b
calculated by fitting the motivational model (number 5, see the
‘‘Materials and Methods’’ section). We found a significant
relationship between the fitted values of I/b in Waage’s model
and the value of Cox’s model covariate (R
2=0.27; regression
equation beta=2.15-0.066I/b; F. test =17.57; df=1;64, P-value
,0.001). The subjects that reported a larger increase in motivation
to stay when a sphere was found (relative to the tendency of
motivation to decrease over time) were those subjects who were
not inclined to leave a patch when they found a sphere.
Discussion
Our results provide evidence for a simple decision-making
process, similar to what is generally assumed in parasitoids [37]
and bumblebees [2]. Humans decide whether to stay in a patch or
move to another one according to the sensitivity to finding a
resource. The state of the motivation level depends on the number
of rewards received but not on the among-patch resource
distribution: humans use a motivational mechanism of incremental
arousals as a response to finding rewarding items, irrespective of
the resource distribution. In the analysis of the course of
motivation, we noticed that the consideration of the number of
empty chests found improved the prediction, especially when the
motivation drops just before leaving the patch. This effect,
however, is weaker than the incremental effect of opening a filled
chest.
Another variable can be used to explain the residence time. As
Hutchinson et al. [3] found, the time since the last capture
influences the decision to leave the patch. However, in their
experiment, the time since the last capture was sufficient to explain
the residence time. In the present work, we need to incorporate the
effect of finding of an item. One possible explanation could be that
humans strongly respond to the type of foraging task. The game
used by Hutchinson et al. simulates angling, an activity in which
the subject experiences a sort of ambush predation: he stays in the
same place and waits until a fish takes the bait. In our game, the
subject moves between the domes and between the chests inside
the domes. In the first case, the time since the last discovery could
be perceived as being longer by a subject who is passively foraging
than in the second case, where the time between two successive
discoveries is the time it takes to open the chests. It is then
plausible that the evaluation of the remaining number of prey in
the patch could be linked more so to a time cue in the first case
than in the second one. Regardless, it is remarkable that in both
experiments the human subjects seem unable to switch from the
incremental rule when they face an even distribution. This is a
strong convergence between two studies designed with a different
interface and for a different purpose.
The experiment is based on the ability of people to
communicate their motivation to stay in a patch. To accurately
record the motivation course, the level of motivation felt is asked
every time a chest is opened. This method could partly influence
the declared motivation. Indeed, there is a strong tendency for
humans to make up plausible stories to justify decisions that are
actually normally determined by processes of which humans are
Human’s Motivation to Foraging
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 December 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 12 | e14251not consciously aware [22]. Having to declare the motivation
every time a chest is opened could also influence the leaving-
behavior. A high declared motivation could prompt the subject to
stay in the dome even if he wanted to leave. Nevertheless, the
subjects were aware that the motivation level they declared had no
influence at all on the score. The accuracy of the declared
Figure 5. Motivational course during the foraging time of a player classified as ‘‘poor’’, ‘‘medium’’ and ‘‘good’’, using the
motivation adjustment described in the text.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014251.g005
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of a physical intensity law suggests that an exponential variation of
a physical intensity of a stimulus (for example, noise) is often
perceived as a linear variation. This could be applied to the
proprioceptive appreciation of motivation. It is plausible that the
linear mental scale for exponential variation could be responsible
for the linearization of the motivational feeling. The neural basis of
this phenomenon in now known and has been demonstrated in
primates [38,39]. It also could be accentuated by the experimental
discretization and truncation of the motivation scale. The arbitrary
scale of motivation from 0 to 9 could influence the perception of
motivation and suggests a linear scale to the subject. Moreover, in
many cases, when many rewards were found, the subjects gave a
long series of ‘‘9’’ marks, when actually his real motivation level
was unknown. However, the relationship between what the players
declared and the statistical analysis of the patch-leaving tendency
demonstrates the consistency between behavior and the declared
feeling. In this sense, reported motivation is consistent with the
leaving behavior observed.
Some neuroscientific studies have suggested that the motiva-
tional mechanism discovered in our study could have a neural
basis in the human brain. For example, Aston-Jones and Cohen
[40] demonstrated that the locus coeruleus-norepinephrine (LC-
NE) system is implicated in the control of the decision to persist in
a given action or switch to another. They described two neural
activity patterns (phasic and tonic modes), which are similar to the
proximate mechanism we found here: in the phasic mode
(associated with a high level of task performance), neurons exhibit
a phasic activation responding to the task-relevant stimuli. In
contrast, cells fail to respond to the task-relevant stimuli during the
tonic mode (associated with a poor level of task performance)
[41–43]. Thus, the neural activity of the LC-NE system could
provide a biological basis for the motivational mechanism
highlighted here: during a high performance task (visiting a
‘‘good’’ patch), the motivation suddenly increases in response to
the rewards (phasic mode of the LC-NE system). When the task
performance is low (visiting a ‘‘poor’’ patch), the motivation
decreases and the subject becomes less sensitive to the task-
relevant stimuli (tonic mode).
Our study confirms that humans seem unable to adjust their
response to the spatial distribution of resources because they use
an incremental mechanism irrespective of the resource distribution
[3,31]. Both our study and other studies suggest that humans are
adapted to finding resources with a clumped distribution over
patches. Wilke and Barrett [44] expected the cognitive skills of
humans to be adapted to the types of fitness-relevant problems that
people faced in ancestral environments. Hunter-gatherer societies
prevailed during two million years of human history. We thus
hypothesize that natural selection tailored a proximate mechanism
for patch leaving, which is strongly adaptive in an environment
where food is distributed in an aggregated way, as is the case in
hunter-gathering populations. By moving to the savanna,
hominids faced dispersed but sometimes profitable food sources
[45] that corresponded to an aggregative distribution of resources.
In the patchy savanna environment, selection would have favored
Table 2. Estimated regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE) and hazard ratios (exp (b)) for covariates that have a significant
effect (P-value,0.05) on the patch-leaving tendency of humans in a multi-patch environment. x
2 corresponds to the likelihood
ratio test.
b exp(b ) SE(b ) x
2(df ) P-value
Effect of the within-patch experience
Number of full chests opened so far 20.1631 0.85 0.0205 63.17 1.9e
215
Number of empty chests opened so far 0.0519 1.053 0.0172 9.13 2.5e
203
Time since the last capture 20.0097 0.99 0.0026 13.90 1.9e
204
Effect of the previous experience
Total number of filled chests opened before entering the patch 0.0188 1.019 0.0054 12.18 4.8
204
Total number of empty chest opened before entering the patch 20.01 0.99 0.0023 17.85 2.4e
205
Effect of fixed covariates
Age of the subject 20.068 0.934 0.0181 14.14 1.7e
204
Laterality (left-handed) 21.29 0.275 0.4136 9.73 1.8e
203
Note: the overall significance of the fitting model: x
2=534, df=67.4, P-value,0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014251.t002
Figure 6. Relationship between Cox’s model b and the term I/b
from Waage’s model. The Y-axis refers to the values of the effect of
opening a filled chest plotted against on the hazard rate for Cox’s
proportional hazard model. The X-axis is obtained from the motiva-
tional model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014251.g006
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distribution. Thus, the motivational mechanism observed here and
the neural mechanism detailed above are most likely adaptations
that were selected for during ancestral times and are, still adaptive
now for foraging on the internet or in a supermarket.
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